Washington Just Approved A Historic Agreement

President Trump has locked in a 30-year nuclear deal that could let Saudi Arabia enrich its own uranium using American technology — raising big questions about who really controls the most dangerous power on earth.

Story Snapshot

  • The U.S. and Saudi Arabia signed a long-term nuclear cooperation deal giving American firms a leading role in the kingdom’s new civilian nuclear program.
  • The agreement reportedly allows a path to Saudi uranium enrichment, without the strict “gold standard” limits used in some past deals.
  • The Trump administration says new “bilateral safeguards” and extra verification will keep the program peaceful and prevent weapons development.
  • Nonproliferation experts and some lawmakers warn the deal weakens long-standing guardrails and could fuel a future nuclear arms race in the Middle East.

Trump’s Saudi Nuclear Deal: What Was Just Approved

President Trump has approved a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia that will run roughly through 2056 and is valued at tens of billions of dollars. The deal, often called a “123 agreement” under the Atomic Energy Act, lets American companies build and operate nuclear reactors and supply fuel for a Saudi civilian power program. Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman signed the cooperation documents, with the White House calling it a landmark step in U.S.-Saudi ties.

The Department of Energy says the deal opens “substantial opportunities” for U.S. firms inside Saudi Arabia’s nuclear sector while advancing economic and security goals. An administration memo reviewed by reporters claims the agreement “upholds the highest standards of nuclear safety and nonproliferation” and is limited to peaceful energy use. At the same time, the pact is now headed to Congress for a 90-day review window, giving lawmakers a short period to decide whether they will try to block or modify it.

Safeguards, Oversight, and What’s Missing

The administration stresses that the deal comes with a separate bilateral safeguards agreement, plus added verification on sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle such as enrichment and reprocessing. A report sent to Congress in late 2025 says nuclear materials and equipment cannot be transferred to Saudi Arabia until this safeguards agreement is in force, and promises extra checks in the areas most linked to bomb-making. Officials argue that keeping U.S. companies at the center of Saudi nuclear development will increase transparency and make it harder for the kingdom to secretly shift to weapons work.

Yet the same memo confirms the agreement does not include the strict “gold standard” used in only a few past 123 deals, which fully ban enrichment and reprocessing by the partner country. It also does not require Saudi Arabia to adopt the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol, which would allow more intrusive inspections. A Reuters-reviewed document indicates Washington has lifted earlier demands for rapid United Nations inspections and for Saudi Arabia to give up domestic enrichment, replacing them with more flexible language about “additional safeguards and verification measures.”

The Enrichment Question and Regional Risks

Multiple news outlets and expert groups report that the agreement leaves open, and may actively support, a future Saudi uranium enrichment program on its own soil. The Wall Street Journal and policy analysts describe a possible “black box” enrichment facility that would be built in Saudi Arabia but run by U.S. companies, giving the kingdom access to enriched fuel without full visibility into the technology. Under the terms described by U.S. officials, American firms could construct such a plant after a joint U.S.-Saudi feasibility study, if both sides decide to move forward.

Critics warn that once a country can enrich uranium, it holds a latent weapons capability, even if it claims peaceful motives. Arms control advocates point out that past U.S. policy tried to prevent new enrichment in unstable regions, especially the Middle East, to avoid an arms race with rivals like Iran. They argue that allowing Saudi Arabia this option, without the toughest oversight tools, risks copying the same patterns that many Americans already see across government: short-term deals and corporate gains now, with long-term security dangers pushed onto future generations.

Why This Deal Hits Nerves on Both the Right and the Left

Supporters say the deal gives the United States a way to shape Saudi Arabia’s nuclear future instead of leaving the kingdom to buy reactors from Russia or China, whose standards may be weaker. They argue that U.S. technology is safer, that added bilateral safeguards will reduce the chance of cheating, and that the partnership could stabilize energy markets by letting Saudi Arabia use nuclear power instead of only oil. For Americans tired of high energy prices and global dependence, this sounds like a strategic win that protects U.S. jobs and influence.

Opponents, including some in Congress, see something else: a powerful foreign monarchy gaining sensitive nuclear capabilities while Washington quietly relaxes rules meant to stop weapons spread. They worry this reflects a deeper pattern where both parties talk tough on national security, yet bend long-standing standards when big money and foreign deals are on the table. For citizens on the right and left who already doubt the “deep state” and global elites, a decades-long nuclear pact with a troubled ally looks like one more example of the system serving itself, not the American people.

Sources:

humanevents.com, abcnews.com, armscontrol.org, brookings.edu, newsmax.com, reuters.com, cnn.com, energy.gov, thebreakthrough.org, docs.house.gov, heritage.org, thebulletin.org, ans.org